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Most real world emission permit schemes are in eﬀect hybrid instruments that feature
both quantity and price controls. While the eﬀects of price bounds are well understood
for issues such as uncertain abatement costs it has not been investigated how such bounds
aﬀect time-consistency of environmental regulation and research incentives. The present
paper analyzes these issues for two types of innovation. While price bounds increase static
eﬃciency they reduce incentives to innovate. Commitment on details of a scheme’s design
might be necessary to avoid the latter.
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11 Introduction
The choice of the regulatory instrument to implement environmental objectives has substantial
eﬀects on both static as well as dynamic eﬃciency.1 Recent studies on instrument choice in the
context of innovation and diﬀusion of new technologies have focused on prices versus quantities
and the time-inconsistency of environmental regulation.2 A common feature in these papers
is to consider time-inconsistency with respect to the stringency of a speciﬁc instrument while
taking the instrument itself as given. Although it might be reasonably argued that governments
manage to commit on quantity regulation by eﬀectively demonizing taxes (as is the case in the
US), a permit scheme can easily be designed in a way to mimic a tax. Hybrid instruments as
introduced by Roberts and Spence (1976) can be sold as a permit scheme to both industry and
the public but eﬀectively impose a regime of price regulation.
A large number of past, current and proposed permit schemes are in fact a combination of
quantity and price regulation. Price bounds are rarely called by their real name (however, they
have been proposed to be included in what might become the future US climate policy (The-
Economist 2007)) but come in a variety of disguises. Fixed penalties for excessive emissions as in
the former Danish carbon and the US ODS (ozone depleting substances) programs (OECD 2003)
and - the widely used - buyout option in the UK renewables obligation program (DTI 2004)
impose an upper bound on the permit price. The same holds for the possibility to earn credits
for abatement elsewhere, e.g. using CDM in the European Union Carbon Trading Scheme or in
other industries as in the proposed US American Carbon Safety Act (The-Economist 2007), or
just by borrowing permits from future periods.
Permit schemes can be - and often are - designed as a hybrid instrument that at least poten-
1For a general survey see Cropper and Oates (1992). Jaﬀe et al. (2002) and Requate (2005a) concentrate on
dynamic aspects.
2See Laﬀont and Tirole (1996), Denicol` o (1999), Requate and Unold (2003), Requate (2005b), Perino (2008)
and Krysiak (2008).
2tially mimics a tax. The usual distinction between instrument choice and stringency is, hence,
not always appropriate. The penalty for excessive emissions or other details of instrument’s de-
sign seem not more or less prone to adjustments by the government than the number of permits
in the market. While the eﬀects of hybrid instruments is well understood in static contexts this
does not hold for the development and diﬀusion of new technologies. Here, an upper bound on
the permit price is likely to aﬀect the economic performance of tradeable permits since new tech-
nologies are usually protected by patents that give rise to monopoly pricing. Distortions due to
market power in the eco-industry that provides advanced abatement technologies have recently
been studied by David and Sinclair-Desgagne (2005), Requate (2005b) and Perino (2008).
The present paper contributes by analyzing the eﬀect of an endogenous design of permit
schemes on diﬀusion of new technologies and innovation incentives. For two types of innovation
plain permits, i.e. a scheme without price bounds, are compared to a ﬂexible version where the
government can set an upper limit on the permit price.
The main results are that increased ﬂexibility allows to mend static ineﬃciencies caused by
the eco-industry’s market power but thereby reduce incentives to innovate. While the former
eﬀect is unambiguously positive the latter can be detrimental. Avoiding undesirable reductions
in R&D incentives requires commitment on design issues that might be hard to achieve in
practice.
2 The Model
Consider two succeeding periods in a competitive market for a non-durable consumption or
intermediate good Y . In the ﬁrst period only one production technology labeled 1 is available.
If the eco-industry successfully engages in R&D in the ﬁrst period, a new technology 2 producing
a perfect substitute to Y becomes available in the second period. The market’s downward sloping
3inverse demand function in each period is
P = P (Y ),
where Y = Y1 + Y2 is the sum of technologies’ output.
Individual ﬁrms are small, have U-shaped cost functions and entry is free. Both technologies
are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale at the industry level. The industry’s cost
function is therefore given by
C (Y1,Y2) = c1Y1 + c2Y2.
This cost structure is more general than that of Laﬀont and Tirole (1996) and Denicol` o (1999)
by allowing for real economic costs associated with the installation of the new technology (i.e.
c2 > c1).
Technologies might emit pollution as a joint product at a constant ratio to output Yi. The
social damage function D is
D(Y1,Y2) = D(a1Y1 + a2Y2),
where D is increasing and convex and ai ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1,2} and a1 + a2 > 0. The latter
condition ensures that at least one of the technologies is polluting and the problem therefore
relevant for environmental regulation. ai are exogenous parameters indicating by how much
technology 2 is cleaner than technology 1 or vice versa. This speciﬁcation of the cost and
damage functions allows for a number of innovation types. Vertical innovation where the new
technology is cleaner, equally costly and hence strictly preferred (c1 = c2,a1 > a2) analyzed
by Denicol` o (1999) and perfect vertical innovation (c1 = c2,a2 = 0) considered by Laﬀont and
Tirole (1996) are special cases of the types used in this paper.3
3Not all types of innovation consistent with the above speciﬁcation are considered. Instead the focus is on two
exemplary cases that nevertheless extend the set studied by Laﬀont and Tirole (1996), Denicol` o (1999).
4The eco-industry invests into R&D according to the expected value of future patents. In
case of development of a new technology, the successful research ﬁrm is granted a patent in
the second period. It is assumed to set a license fee f linear in output of the new technology.4
Imitation of the new technology is ruled out, hence patents are strong and of suﬃcient breadth.
The government maximizes social welfare. In the absence of a commitment on either taxes
or plain permits, it regulates pollution with a permit quantity E and an upper bound τ on the
permit price (Roberts and Spence 1976, Pizer 2002). If the permit price exceeds the threshold,
additional permits are sold at this price and the quantity constraint ceases to be binding. This
design enables the government to choose endogenously between price and quantity regulation
by adjusting stringencies within a given legal framework. The distinction made in the literature
between a commitment on instruments and on stringencies becomes obsolete. The situation
where the government has full ﬂexibility on all policy variables in the post-innovation period is
compared to a commitment on taxes and plain permits.
In what follows, production and emission control in period 1 are ignored as there is nothing
new to be learned. In the ﬁrst period only the research investment matters. If the eco-industry’s
eﬀorts remain fruitless, nothing changes compared to the ﬁrst period. However, if research is
successful and technology 2 becomes available in period 2 the timing is like in Denicol` o (1999),
Laﬀont and Tirole (1996) and Perino (2008). After the new technology has arrived and its
properties are known, the government adjusts regulation and grants a patent to the successful
research ﬁrm. Second, the research ﬁrm chooses the level of the license fee f. Third, ﬁrms decide
to enter or exit the industry, which technology to use and how much to produce.
4This is equivalent to a ﬁxed fee per ﬁrm as ﬁrms are small and face U-shaped cost functions.
53 Vertical Environmental Innovation
Assume that the new technology is equivalent to the established one but emits less of the same
pollutant (0 < a2 < a1,c1 = c2 = c, see Figure 1). Hence, the new technology is strictly
preferred and innovation is therefore vertical. Without loss of generality assume that a1 = 1.
Denicol` o (1999) studies this case both with and without commitment on future tax rates and
permit quantities but does not consider a price bound. Laﬀont and Tirole (1996) analyze a
limiting case where the new technology is perfectly clean (a2 = 0).
Figure 1: Vertical environmental innovation
3.1 Plain Permits
First, consider the case of plain permits, i.e. without an upper bound on the permit price. The
equilibrium conditions in the market clearing stage are given by
P(Y ) = c + γ, (1)
P(Y ) = c + a2γ + f, (2)
6Y1 + a2Y2 ≤ E, (3)
where γ is the equilibrium permit price. Firms are indiﬀerent between using the established and
the new technology if f = (1 − a2)γ. A proﬁt maximizing patent holding ﬁrm will ensure that
the license fee always satisﬁes this condition. If f < (1 − a2)γ, it could raise the fee without
aﬀecting output of the new technology due to the permit constraint or, if f > (1 − a2)γ, the
new technology is not used at all. Note that this does not yet deﬁne the equilibrium license
fee. The permit price depends on aggregate output which is itself a function of f implicitly
deﬁned by (1)-(3). The patent holder can inﬂuence both aggregate output and that of the new
technology (Requate 2005b, Perino 2008). Hence, the patent holding ﬁrm has some discretion
on f while maximizing its proﬁts π = f · Y2(f) subject to the binding permit constraint (3).
The ﬁrst order conditions yield Y2 = E
a2 and Y2 + f ∂Y2
∂f = 0 for Y2 < E











= 0 for the case Y2 < E
a2.
The government aims to implement Y2 = E
a2 = Y ∗
2 and Y1 = Y ∗
1 = 0, where an asterisk
denotes static ﬁrst best levels. However, due to proﬁt maximizing of the patent holding ﬁrm
this is only possible if










2 ) − c
≤ 1. (4)
Otherwise, the patent holder increases the license fee above f = (1−a2)[P(Y ∗
2 ) − c] and thereby
reduces output of the new technology below the optimal level and triggers production by the
established one. The quantity restriction imposed by permits is not always suﬃcient to eﬀectively
constrain monopoly pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 Monopoly pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm creates distortions under plain
emission permits if (4) does not hold and innovation is vertical.
This qualiﬁes a result by Denicol` o (1999) who conjectures that permits are eﬃcient by assuming
that Y = E
a2.
73.2 Permits with Price Bound
An upper bound τ on the equilibrium permit price can avoid this source of static ineﬃciency.
If γe = min[γ,τ] is the eﬀective permit price and τ = P(Y ∗
2 ) − c, this imposes an upper bound
of (1 − a2)[P(Y ∗
2 ) − c] on the license fee. For license fees exceeding this threshold, the permit
constraint ceases to be binding and the entire output is produced by the established technology.
This is not in the interest of the patent holding ﬁrm. Hence, with τ = P(Y ∗
2 )−c any E ≤ a2Y ∗
2
implements the ﬁrst best static optimum. This includes E = 0, i.e. a standard emission tax.
Proposition 2 Emission permits with an upper price bound and taxes are statically eﬃcient
under vertical innovation.
Note, in all cases where the advanced design increases static eﬃciency patent holder’s proﬁts and
hence research incentives are strictly lower under the ﬂexible design than under plain permits.
The bound on permit price restricts proﬁt maximizing of the research ﬁrm. Plain permits fail to
implement the static ﬁrst best in general, while taxes are equivalent to the ﬂexible scheme. The
government is therefore indiﬀerent between a tax and the ﬂexible instrument both ex-ante and
ex-post. Whether it prefers plain permits or the ﬂexible scheme/taxes ex-ante depends on the
trade-oﬀ between static and dynamic eﬃciency. If taxes induce excessive R&D incentives they
clearly dominate plain permits. However, if plain permits result in under-investment in R&D,
they might well be preferred ex-ante. In this case the government has incentives to commit on
future design of environmental regulation.
Proposition 3 Research incentives are less under the ﬂexible scheme than with plain permits
whenever ﬂexibility is of value ex-post. The ﬂexible design is equivalent to a pollution tax both
in static and dynamic terms.
Research incentives are strictly positive because the externality requires a reduction in output
of the new technology compared to a situation without market failures. Thereby ﬁrms have a
8positive willingness to pay for the new technology given static optimal regulation.5 The patent
holding ﬁrm can appropriate this amount by license fees. However, unless plain permits are
used, monopoly pricing does not distort the allocation. Hence, there is no time-inconsistency
with respect to patent law. Granting intellectual property rights is a credible promise. However,
the dynamic incentives created are solely determined by the size of the externality of the new
technology and therefore only by chance ﬁrst best.
4 A Polluting Industry Facing a Clean Substitute
In this section a diﬀerent type of innovation is considered. Contrary to the type in the previous
section, the new technology has higher marginal costs than the established one (c1 < c2) but is
perfectly clean (a2 = 0). Assume that the new technology is socially desirable but not strictly
superior to the established one (see Figure 2). This case has been studied by Abrego and Perroni
(2002) but for adoption decisions instead of R&D. Again, the model by Laﬀont and Tirole (1996)
is a limiting case where the private costs of production of the new technology become arbitrarily
close to that of the established technology (c1+ = c2). Electricity production is a case in point
where wind and solar power are clean but so far more expensive alternatives to nuclear power
and fossil fuels. Similarly, fuel cells provide a clean substitute to traditional combustion engines
but currently at higher private costs.
4.1 Plain Permits
The equilibrium of the production stage with plain permits is given by
P(Y ) = c1 + γ,
P(Y ) = c2 + f,
Y1 ≤ E,
5This does not hold if the new technology is perfectly clean, i.e. a2 = 0 (Laﬀont and Tirole 1996).
9where γ is the equilibrium permit price. The above system of equations determines the equilib-
rium output quantities Y1 and Y2 and the equilibrium permit price, i.e. γ = c2 − c1 + f if both
technologies are used at the same time as is socially optimal (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: A clean but expensive substitute
In the previous stage the patent holding ﬁrm faces a residual demand of
˜ Y2 (f) = Y (c2 + f) − E.
The research ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts π = f · ˜ Y2 (f) over f. The equilibrium license fee ˆ f > 0
is deﬁned by the standard monopoly pricing condition −∂Y
∂P
ˆ f
˜ Y2( ˆ f) = 1.
The government chooses the permit quantity E to maximize post-innovation welfare. The











∂E > 0. Since −c1 −D0(E)+c2 = 0 is the condition for the social optimum and
∂Y
∂E [P(Y (E)) − c2] > 0, the second-best permit quantity Eplain and hence equilibrium output of
technology 1 is strictly larger than the social optimum Y ∗
1 .
10Proposition 4 Monopoly pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm creates distortions under plain
emission permits if a polluting industry faces a perfectly clean but expensive substitute. Aggregate
output is too low while emissions are too high.
4.2 Permits with Price Bound
In this regulatory setting the equilibrium permit price is bound from above and hence γ =
min[c2 −c1 +f,τ]. The residual demand of the patent holding ﬁrm under the ﬂexible scheme is
therefore
˜ Y2 (f) =

   
   
0 : f > c1 − c2 + τ
Y (c2 + f) − E : 0 ≤ f < c1 − c2 + τ.
The equilibrium license fee is f = min[ ˆ f,c1 − c2 + τ − ], where  is arbitrarily small. The
maximum permit price τ thereby indirectly imposes also an upper bound on the license fee.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government sets the policy variables E and τ to maximize post-
innovation static welfare. Use of the new technology is socially optimal which requires τ > c2−c1.
However, any increase of τ above this threshold results in a rise of f and therefore in a price
increase and in an undesirable reduction of aggregate output. The static social optimum is
therefore implemented by setting τ = c2−c1+ and E such that D0(E) = c2−c1. Hence, f = 0.
Proposition 5 Emission permits with an upper price bound are statically eﬃcient but expropri-
ate the patent holding ﬁrm if a polluting industry faces a perfectly clean but expensive substitute.
Market power and research incentives, purposely generated by patent law, are destroyed by an
opportunistic use of environmental regulation. In contrast to the type of innovation considered
in section 3, static eﬃciency and positive research incentives can not coincide. Hence, although
the government is likely to prefer plain permits ex-ante6 it has incentives to impose a price bound
ex-post. In order to stimulate innovation via patents the government has to credibly commit
6This is not the case if the static distortions exceed the social gain of innovation.
11both to grant and enforce intellectual property rights and to details of future environmental
regulation. While the credibility of patents has received considerable attention, commitment
problems arising from the design of environmental regulation have so far been neglected.
Taxes are not able to achieve the static ﬁrst best in this setting. Due to constant returns
to scale either one technology is used exclusively or if ﬁrms are indiﬀerent, a random mix of
technologies results.
5 Conclusion
Most real world permit schemes incorporate mechanisms that eﬀectively impose an upper bound
on the permit price. However, with a hybrid scheme the common distinction between a com-
mitment on the instrument and its stringency is not appropriate. A quantity instrument such
as tradeable permits can easily be turned into a price instrument by an adequate adjustment of
the upper price bound - a parameter as easily changed as the number of permits available.
The hybrid nature of permit schemes and the potential lack of commitment to design details
have important repercussions on the diﬀusion of new technologies and R&D incentives. While
the ﬂexibility gained by the opportunity to directly control the permit price reduces distortions
caused by market power of the eco-industry, it diminishes incentives to invest in the development
of cleaner technologies.
The negative eﬀects on research incentives can only be avoided by committing on the future
design of permit schemes. Something that - though not infeasible - is likely to be harder to
achieve than a commitment on the instrument used and that should be taken into account when
designing new permit schemes, e.g. to implement any future US climate policy.
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